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In Unlocking the Full Potential of the Information Age, a publication
distributed to prospective foreign investors in the Multimedia Super Corri-
dor, a high technology national development plan and foreign direct in-
vestment scheme designed to leapfrog the country into fully developed
nation status by the year 2020, the Malaysian government provides the Bill
of Guarantees to demonstrate the "Government's Commitment" to compa-
nies locating in the Corridor. The executive branch document explains:
Malaysia offers a set of unprecedented incentives to companies involved in the
creation, distribution, integration or application of multimedia products and
services within the MSC. The generous terms of the 10-point Bill reflect the
commitment of the Malaysian Government to MSC-status companies -- and its
willingness to remove all obstacles to nurture an environment that encourages
the growth of multimedia industries.'
* D.Phil, University of Oxford; J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A. Vassar College. I
would like to thank Yves Dezalay, Jim Harris, Godfrey Hodgson, and Annelise Riles.
I MULTIMEDIA DEV. CORP. MALAYSIA, UNLOCKING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE
INFORMATION AGE 12, available at http://www.mdc.com.my/package/.
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This paper concerns itself with the first guarantee, the promise to
"[p]rovide a world-class physical and information infrastructure"2 to MSC-
status companies.
Territorially, the MSC runs from the world's largest twin towers, the
Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur, to the new state-of-the-art Kuala Lum-
pur International Airport. The Corridor's construction will proceed in three
stages. During the first phase, running from 1996 to 2003, the government
will construct the physical infrastructure of the Corridor, launch seven flag-
ship applications, produce cyberlaws, build two smart cities and attract
world-class foreign companies to locate operations within the corridor. The
second phase will run from 2004 to 2010, during which the MSC will be
connected to other high technology centres, attract additional foreign com-
panies and further develop the flagship applications. During the third
phase, which will run until 2020, Malaysia will reach fully-developed na-
tion status, establish itself as a global test bed for multimedia applications,
form an International Cybercourt of Justice and attract another slew of for-
eign companies.
To promote investment, the government offers a range of incentives to
companies. These incentives, the Bill of Guarantees, include commitments:
1. To provide a world-class physical and information infrastruc-
ture.
2. To allow unrestricted employment of local and foreign knowl-
edge workers.
3. To ensure freedom of ownership by exempting companies with
MSC Status from local ownership requirements.
4. To give the freedom to source capital globally for MSC infra-
structure, and the right to borrow funds globally.
5. To provide competitive financial incentives, including Pioneer
Status (100 percent tax exemption) for up to ten years or an in-
vestment tax allowance for up to five years and no duties on
the importation of multimedia equipment.
6. To become a regional leader in Intellectual Property Protection
and Cyberlaws.
7. To ensure no censorship of the Internet.
8. To provide globally competitive telecommunications tariffs.
9. To tender key infrastructure contracts to leading companies
willing to use the MSC as their regional hub.
10. To provide a high-powered implementation agency to act as an
effective one-stop super shop.4
2Id. at7.
' See id. at 6.
4 See id. at 7.
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Among the cyberlaws promoted by the government are the Digital
Signatures Act, Computer Crimes Act, Copyright Amendment Act, Elec-
tronic Government Act and the Multimedia and Communications Act.5 The
government also plans several high technology infrastructure projects, in-
cluding, Electronic Govemment, the Multipurpose Card, Smart Schools,
Telemedicine, Research and Development Cluster, Worldwide Manufactur-
ing Webs and Borderless Marketing.6 By 1999, 232 companies had been
granted MSC status. Thirty-three of these companies are global leaders in
high technology.7
To guide development of the MSC, the government has established an
International Advisory Panel, comprised of global leaders in high technol-
ogy. The Panel meets yearly. Among the members are Craig Barrett,
President and Chief Operating Officer of Intel Corporation; Bob Bishop,
Chairman of Silicon Graphics World Trade Corporation; Michael Bloom-
berg, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Bloomberg; Sir Peter
Bonfield, CEO of British Telecom; Professor Sir Alec Broers, Vice Chan-
cellor of Cambridge University; Larry Ellison, Chairman and CEO of Ora-
cle Corporation; Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft; Nobu Yuki
Idei, President and CEO of Sun Microsystems; William F. Miller, Professor
of Public and Private Management, Computer Science at the Stanford Uni-
versity Graduate School of Business; Jun-Ichiro Miyazu, President of NTT
Corporation; Dr. Kenichi Ohmae of Ohmae and Associates; and Alvin Tof-
fier, founder of Toffler and Associates The MSC is promoted as the Ma-
laysian government's "gift to the world,"9 an "island of excellence '"1
comprising seventy-five of the 331,000 kilometres of the country's sover-
eign territory.
While the government presents the MSC as the embodiment of the fu-
ture, structurally it bears remarkable resemblance to the colonial legal or-
ders. The enclave nature of the MSC is reminiscent of the colonial dual
legal orders. At the same time, the international legal and economic orders
have undergone profound changes. The international legal order is now
premised on sovereign absolutism and equality among nation-states. The
reigning economic paradigm is high technology rather than manufacturing
or the spice trade. Discussion of the continuities and discontinuities be-
tween colonial and present day transnational legal orders must thus attend
5 See id. at 8.
6 See MULTIMEDIA DEV. CORP. MALAYSIA, SEVEN FLAGSHIP APPLICATIONS, available at
http://www.mdc.com.my/package/.
7 See Y.A. Othman, MSC: Propelling Malaysia into the Information Era, Paper Presenta-
tion before the International Institute of Communications Annual Meeting and Conference
(July 9, 1999) (paper on file with author).
8 See UNLOCKING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 1, at 18.
9 Id. at2.
"° Id. at 5.
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to a number of variables. Further, to the extent possible, rhetoric must be
distinguished from practice.
Industrial and high technology enclaves require tremendous physical
infrastructure. During the colonial period in Malaysia the extraction of
mineral resources from tin mines necessitated the building of railroads, the
construction of ports, the migration of workers, etc. Without this infrastruc-
ture, goods would have remained in mines and never made their way to in-
ternational markets. Today high technology economies have infrastructure
needs beyond their industrial predecessors. The Internet typically is pre-
sented as transcending time and place. However, to build successfully a
high technology economy, a country must construct roads, airports, facto-
ries and power plants, lay telecommunications lines, train workers, etc. Just
as during the colonial period, the creation of an infrastructure is a transna-
tional endeavour. Both capital and skills often lie beyond a country's bor-
ders. To create infrastructure, the architects, foreign and domestic
oligarchic states and compound corporations, of the transnational commer-
cial domain draw resources selectively from the local political domain.
This paper explores the MSC's facilitative infrastructure, including real es-
tate development by Cyberview Holdings, the Kuala Lumpur International
Airport, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, the North-South Expressway and
also Telekom Malaysia and MEASAT. Before doing so, the next section
discusses infrastructure development in proto-Malaysia.
Facilitative infrastructure of the high technology economy includes
airports, banking networks, fibre optic cables, power plants, railway lines,
roads and satellites. The construction of each requires foreign and domestic
actors. European, Japanese and US companies possess the bulk of infra-
structure research and development resources. Many of these companies
are the product of privatizations. Although foreign companies play a major
role in infrastructure sectors, typically oligarchic governments partner with
home state compound corporations to coordinate and oversee projects.
Infrastructure production in developing countries occurs at the
intersection of the privatization and globalisation processes. Public and
private laws facilitate and subsequently regulate infrastructure projects. As
foreign and domestic and also public and private actors and laws are
involved in most projects, infrastructure law is transnational. Based on the
speculative or entrepreneurial nature of infrastructure construction,
commentators often define the field as project finance, referring to a model
of financing infrastructure projects whereby costs of building are recouped
after construction through incremental user charges. Lawyers term this
field "project finance law.""
"See CLIFFORD CHANCE, PROJECT FINANCE (199 1); SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE: A RESOURCE FOR GOVERNMENTS,
SPONSORS, LENDERS, LAWYERS, AND PROJECT PARTICIPANTS (1998); GRAHAM D. VINTER,




During the colonial period, integration of proto-Malaysia into the
transnational commercial order depended upon facilitative infrastructure.
Governments built infrastructure to shift economies away from trans-
shipment and towards agriculture and mining. Proto-Malaysia proved rich
in rubber and tin. Extraction of tin and its transportation to international
markets required building mines, importing labor, laying railroads lines and
constructing ports. In the late nineteenth century, the British laid vast
stretches of rail lines throughout the world. In proto-Malaysia foreign pub-
lic and private actors partnered with domestic Malay and Chinese political
and commercial elites to build railways. In addition, railway construction
and operation required large labor pools. The colonial government dictated
macro-strategy and the British Residents carried out construction at the
state level.
The proto-Malaysian infrastructure projects faced similar challenges as
present-day project financiers face. Infrastructure projects required mobi-
lizing the support of multiple political jurisdictions and private corporate
actors. Support provided was financial and political. Tasks and risks were
spread over multiple parties. Projects faced political, commercial and envi-
ronmental risks. Typically statutorily-created government departments co-
ordinated and carried out projects under the Crown prerogative. Using
prerogative powers, the government created public corporations to guide
projects. Also, governments passed an array of legislative enactments to
remove impediments to the projects and to ensure project policies would
carry the force of law. The following subsections discuss colonial infra-
structure projects, focusing on banks, railways and tin mines.
A. Banks
The financing of overseas enterprises required establishing a banking
network. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British undertook overseas
banking in earnest. Depreciation of domestic monetary rates forced banks
to journey overseas in search of more productive employment of resources.
For this reason, entrepreneurs in overseas territories found infrastructure fi-
nancing readily available. According to A. S. J. Baster, "Cheap and easy
money for overseas borrowers was at any rate a striking characteristic of the
period in which the first Empire banks were founded." 2 Initially, chartered
companies controlled overseas banking.
For the first half of the eighteenth century, the East India Company en-
joyed monopoly rights by Crown charter over banking in large regions of
the Far East. The Company opened its own banks and granted several pri-
vate enterprises the right to carry out banking activities. Company control
over banking was short lived. From 1829 to 1832 a number of banks failed.
12 A.S.J. BASTER, THE IMPERIAL BANKS 2 (1929).
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The sole survivor was the Bank of Bengal, which the Company owned and
appointed three of nine directors. Nonetheless, the Company continued to
guard its monopoly position, a position that eroded as exchange banks en-
tered the East Asian region.
In expanding into the Far East, exchange banks had to contend not only
with the Company but also the Chinese government. China took an un-
friendly stance towards incursion of British Banks into its political sphere.
The Chinese stance was in part a protective response on behalf of its own
banking networks. Throughout the nineteenth century, an extensive net-
work of Chinese banks spread throughout Asia. Nonetheless, proceeding
on a piecemeal basis, exchange banks progressively made inroads into the
Chinese territory.
Chinese banking houses financed much of the entrepreneurial activity
of Overseas Chinese communities throughout East Asia.1 Reflective of the
range of commercial enterprises undertaken by Overseas communities,
banks financed farming, insurance, shipping, tin-mining and trade. 4 These
banks also acted as intermediaries for European banks. Raj Brown explains
the intermediary system:
These Chinese business houses also recruited funds from Western banks and
Indian capitalists. Western banks preferred to deal with intermediaries rather
than with the community at large and here the Chinese presented themselves as
useful agents. For example the Hongkong Bank injected funds into the domes-
tic capital markets by providing loans to Chinese capitalists or bank compra-
dores who then on-lent them to merchants, producers and specialized
remittance houses. This limited risk in lending, and overcame the difficulties
inherent in westerners' imperfect knowledge of the local population. The Chi-
nese compradore-capitalist link hence channelled capital from Europe and
elsewhere into the local market.15
Intermingling of the colonial commercial enterprises with Chinese
banking houses involved compounding of public and private law functions.
For instance, colonial governments regularly granted to Chinese banks and
entrepreneurs the public law powers of taxation and monopoly rights.
A small and influential group of Chinese families controlled the bank-
ing network. The families interpenetrated East Asian economies. A single
family often controlled several sectors of the nominally British colonial
economy. For instance the Khaw group played a dominant role in Penang:
The Khaws were based in the British colony of Penang and had strong connec-
tions with the elite in neighbouring Siam [Thailand]. The family's fortunes
from opium farming were invested in an insurance company and in the Koh
13 See Raj Brown, Chinese Business and Banking in (Southeast) Asia Since 1870, in
BANKS AS MULTINATIONALS 173 (Geoffrey Jones ed., 1993).
4 Seeid. at 174.
5 See id. at 175.
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Guan Trust. ... These trustees later invested in Eastern Shipping (1907) and in
Eastern Smelting (1907). ... By 1920 it had 40 sailing vessels (sold in 1923 to
the Straits Steamship Company for $2m). Eastern Smelting, which smelted
ore from the Khaw tin mines of southern Siam, accounted for 18 per cent of all
smelting ore shipped from Penang by 1908. Two years later this had increased
to 29 per cent. Obviously Khaw Soo Cheang's appointment as Governor of
Southern Siam in the 1890s, and his close liaison with the British authorities in
Penang, contributed to the influence of the firm in Siam, Malaya, Sumatra and
even Burma. 
16
Importantly, the Treaty of Nanking signed in 1842 established five
treaty ports that permitted foreign banks. When several East India Com-
pany banks declared bankruptcy, the Crown, in spite of staunch Company
opposition, in 1834 chartered the Oriental Banking Corporation.
17
The Oriental Banking Corporation enjoyed unparalleled prestige in the
region even as new entrants proliferated during the nineteenth century. The
Bank managed a 13% annual average return on investments from its found-
ing until the crash of 1866.18 Its board of directors was comprised of lead-
ing London bankers and persons well connected to the East India
Company.19 During the nineteenth century the Bank established an exten-
sive network of branches throughout Asia. Branches existed in Bombay,
Calcutta, Cape Town, Colombo, Durban, Foochow, Hiogo, Hong Kong,
Kandy, Madras, Mauritius, Melbourne, Port Elizabeth, Sydney, Point de
Galle, Shanghai and Yokohama. In 1884 a number of national crises and
management problems precipitated the liquidation of the Company banks.
In the wake of the crisis, the Eastern Exchange Banks, a network of British
Banks operating in the East, Southeast and South Asia, emerged.2°
Eastern Exchange Bank branch locations were located in many British-
controlled East Asian territories. As Geoffrey Jones notes, "There was an
obvious correlation with the boundaries of British Empire, with the bank
holding prominent positions in the major centres of British political and
commercial influence in the East: Hong Kong, Singapore, Calcutta and
Bombay. '21 Colonial governments held accounts in the exchange banks.22
Also banks were involved in the range of commercial enterprises compris-
ing the colonial economy. To meet this need, banks offered varied prod-
16 See id. at 175-176.
7 See A.S.J. BASTER, THE INTERNATIONAL BANKS 160-161 (1935).
18 Baster, supra note 18, at 163.
19/d.
20 Id at 163-164.
21 Geoffrey Jones, Lending and the HRM Strategies of British Multinational Banks in
Asia Before 1960, in DISCUSSION PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
STUDIES, at 2-3 (University of Reading Department of Economics, Series B, Vol. VI, No.
178 1993/94).
22 See id. at 3-4.
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ucts, including investment, retail and service.23 Although banks projected
an image of staunch lending conservatism, the financing of the colonial
economy necessarily involved financial innovation and experimentation.
Bankers experimented with innovative techniques to facilitate lending
to financially successful and socially closed ethnic groups. For instance,
Chinese business communities were notoriously guarded with information
concerning internal affairs. Jones explains, "Dependence on Asian business
provided a constant temptation to 'sin', or to relax the tenets of British
banking orthodoxy."24
Eastern exchange banks did not limit lending to clients able to put up
appropriate security and to demonstrate liquidating assets. Investments
were made in infrastructure and long-term speculative enterprises. For in-
stance, the treaty ports in China, Bangkok and Manila were all financed by
the Hongkong Bank. Also, banks invested in utilities and manufacturing.
Jones notes that the banks "were certainly intimately associated, through in-
terlocking directorships and long-standing business relationships, with the
other British interests in Asia: the trading companies, agency houses, ship-
ping companies and mines and plantation enterprises which played such an
important role in parts of the Asian economies. '26 Since enterprises were
carried out through colonial political structures, lending patterns mirrored
political patterns.
Banking and commercial networks utilised ethnic intermediaries. Just
as the system of indirect rule depended upon an indigenous elite to mitigate
political risk, so did the Exchange banks. The same paradoxes engendered
by this intermediary system characteristic of the political order were also
manifest in the financial sector. Foreign capital was instrumental in ag-
grandising the position of politically-favored elites. By throwing financial
support behind these elites, British bankers became stakeholders in the
maintenance of local elites' political positions. A similar set of relation-
ships characterises the building of tin mines and railways.
B. Rails and Tin
Railways and tin mines existed throughout proto-Malaysia. 27 Con-
struction and operation of railways occurred on the advice of the British
Resident. The federal government and various state governments financed
the railways. In a ceremonial speech at the opening of a railway linking
Klang and Kuala Lumpur, Rajah Laut of Kuala Lumpur paid verbal tribute
23 See id. at 2.
24 Id. at 13.
25 See id. at 4.
6 Id. at5.
27 Rubber also figured prominently in the colonial economy. COLrN BARLOW THE




to the role of the Governor of the Straits Settlement in effectuating the pro-
ject:
From the fulness of our hearts we bid you welcome to this our country, and
make known to Your Excellency that it affords us great pleasure, as also all the
merchants and Malay inhabitants of the State, to observe the light of your
countenance by day and by night in this unenlightened place; having been en-
lightened now thereby, we are now enabled to bask in the sunshine of your
presence, therefore we the merchants, traders and general inhabitants feel very
much elated at the arrival of Your Excellency on this great occasion. . . .Pre-
vious to the British Government affording us its advice in placing a Resident
here to look after the welfare of Selangor, we felt like one wandering in the
jungle, our way beset by thorns and thickets. If we were not careful how we
guided our footsteps we should inevitably have stepped on the thorns and
wounded our feet. Therefore since the arrival of the British Resident in the
country, we have felt as one elevated up and placed between Earth and Sky.
So great has been the change from our previous to our present condition.
28
The other speeches at the railway opening also suggest, through their
flowery prose and effusive mimicry of British imperial purpose, that sover-
eignty was created through symbolic acts of tribute. 29 Along these lines,
Laut goes on to congratulate the British for achieving all of the imperial
goals:
The first and most important change is that now peace and prosperity reign
throughout and confusion is unknown, so that all can dwell in peace and
safety. The second is that foreigners and strangers now come in crowds, much
to the profit of the country. Thirdly - all the laws are just, therefore everyone
is settled in peace. Fourthly - the country has been opened up and improved
by means of roads so that all can easily come and go. Fifthly - This our rail-
way is now made in order to facilitate our means of transport and to assist in
the development of this State, in order that the traders and others may work
with profit to themselves and to the Government. Places that were far away
have now been brought near, and goods that were dear have now become
cheap.30
From the sound of things, progression to the higher plane had been ef-
fectuated. A narrative of progress underscoring the relationship between
civilization and commerce characterises the opening ceremonies of each
railway.
Railways linked the vast territories comprising the British Empire.
Connections among distinct political units had already been forged through
28 FEDERAL MALAY STATES RAILWAYS, FIFTY YEARS OF RAILWAYS IN MALAYA, 1885-
1935 11 (1935).
29 See ARTHUR S. KELLER, OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, AND FREDERICK J. MANN, CREATION OF
RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS: 1400-1800 49-99 (1938) (discussing the
relationship between transfers of sovereignty and symbolic acts).
30 FIFTY YEARS OF RAILWAYS IN MALAYA, supra note 26, at 11.
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shipping lines. However, railways created further synergies and deepened
the reach of the British in overseas territories. The laying of rail also facili-
tated the building of ports and the multiplying of mines in the inland territo-
ries. Often, rails crossed politically distinct sovereign units and integrated
territories for common commercial purposes. For instance, connections
among the Federated and Unfederated Malay States and the Straits Settle-
ments were laid through rail lines and bridges.31 As each political territory
maintained a modicum of sovereignty over its internal affairs under the
British Resident System, the coordination of rail plans required inter-state
coordination. In fact, money was often lent from one state to another as
capital was pooled to make such an ambitious undertaking possible.
The construction of rails occurred through the exercise of the crown
prerogative. The Crown created a public compound company, the Railway
Administration, to oversee the planning, building and operating of railways.
The Crown empowered the Administration to undertake a range of enter-
prises, including laying rail, building houses, warehouses, offices, con-
structing schools and overseeing inter-state negotiations. The colonial
government monitored the Administration. 32 As well, the Administration
could be sued as an independent corporation.
33
Railways facilitated the transport of tin from mines to ports. Tin ex-
traction required, among other things, the construction of mines and
amendment of labor and land laws. In addition, the operation of mines re-
quired a steady flow of water. Thus, the power of the Residents to issue li-
censes to use waterways proved important. The government controlled all
rivers, streams and waterways within its territories. Also, the Resident con-
trolled the land over which water pipes would run. This power grew in im-
portance as in the 1840s and 1850s speculators discovered large amounts .of
tin in the inland territories.34
In the early twentieth century, three quarters of the world's tin was
drawn from proto-Malaysia. 35 Up until 1911, control over the mines was
vested in state governments.36 According to C. J. Alford, in practice:
"These states are nominally under native rulers, but are in fact governed by
the British Political Residents appointed to each native State and acting un-
31 See AMARJIT KAUR, BRIDGE AND BARRIER: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS IN
COLONIAL MALAYA 31 (1983).
32 CHARLES J. ALFORD, MINING LAW OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 6 (1906).
31 See id. at 23.
34 See KAUR, supra note 29, at 6.
35 See ALFORD, supra note 30, at 69.
36 See id. at 71 ("Subject to the provisions of this Enactment the Resident may from time
to time on behalf of the Ruler of the State lease State land for mining purposes"); id. at 73
("Renewals of such exemption may, at the discretion of the Resident, be granted in like
manner"), and id. at 79, ("This lease is granted by the Sultan of Pahang, acting on the advice
of the British Resident").
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der the supreme control of the Government of Singapore. 37 After 1911,
with the consolidation of the Federated Malay States, mining was federal-
ized and was governed by the Mining Enactment, 1911. 38 Mining was un-
dertaken through a concessionary system. Companies were granted
concessions that afforded public law powers such as policing and also fee
and tax collection.39 Also, the state continued to work on behalf of compa-
nies ,40 and it typically retained the right to expropriate the mine upon pay-
ment of due compensation.
41
Rails were laid to transport tin resources from mines to ports. The first
tin mines were built in Taiping. To bring tin to the nearest port, Port Weld,
the British built the first railroad in the region connecting the two areas.
This railway line ran eight and one half miles. 42 As tin was discovered
elsewhere, additional rail lines were laid. For instance, the government
connected through rail Klang and Kuala Lumpur (1886), Seremban and Port
Dickson (1891), Teluk Anson and Tapah Road (1893) and Prai and Bukit
Mertajam (1899). 41 While lines extended in a piecemeal fashion and in re-
sponse to practical needs, in 1903 all lines were connected to one another.
In the early nineteenth century, railroads were built linking Singapore and
mainland Malaysia. This link superceded the ferry system that had previ-
ously transported persons and goods across the waterway.
44
45The laying of rails often preceded the extraction of mineral resources.
Lines were considered an essential facilitative investment and constituted
an early form of project finance. Financing decisions were based on pro-
jected value. Financing was forthcoming if the bank decided that the rail
lines would be used in large enough volume to recoup the capital invested
and to turn a profit. For example, the building of a rail connecting Ka-
munting and Kuala Kangsar was advocated by the Resident Engineer and
Traffic Manager of the proposed project on the basis of its expected profit-
ability. 46 The Taiping-Port Weld line's reduction in transport cost was used
as a yardstick to judge the proposed rail's profitability. In his annual report,
the engineer pointed out that it was "cheaper to send a load of rice from
Port Weld to Taiping (8 miles) than from Taiping to Kamunting (3 1/2
37 See ALFORD, supra note 30, at 69.
38 See 7 GILBERT STONE, THE MINING LAWS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND OF THE FOREIGN
COUNTRIES: FEDERATED MALAY STATES, MINING ENACTMENT OF 1911 3-4 (1925).
'9 See id. at 5.
40 See id. at 7.
4' See id. at 5, 88.
42 FIFTY YEARS OF RAILWAYS IN MALAYA, supra note 26, at 27.
43 Id at 28-29, 32-33.
44 J.A. STANISTREET, THE MALAYAN RAILWAY 5-6 (1973).
45 Prior to the railways, tin was transported via the waterways. See Kaur, supra note 29,
at xvi.
46 See FIFTY YEARS OF RAILWAYS IN MALAYA, supra note 26, at 27-28. For a discussion
of the use of statistics, see Stanistreet, supra note 45 at 17-21.
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miles). 47 According to the engineer, the cost of transport impeded "the
opening up and working of mines in the Kamunting District and beyond."
The cost of the line was justified on the basis of ex pected income even
though it "might not prove immediately remunerative. '
The Crown chartered a public corporation, The Federated States Rail-
way (F.M.S. Railway), to lay rails. 49 While early construction projects were
carried out by contract, over time it proved more profitable and efficient for
the Corporation itself to complete projects. The contractual means of build-
ing railroads caused such difficulties that a proposed line connecting Ipoh
and Tapah road was cancelled. The Resident Engineer for Railways urged
a shift to governmental construction:
I think I may safely say that experience has shown that in Perak it is not advis-
able to let the Railways by contract. My experience of Railway work, at the
Cape, in Ceylon and here, is conclusive that, with an efficient staff, a Govern-
ment can construct its own Railways more economically and expeditiously,
and ensure better work, than if a contractor is employed.50
The provision of public goods within the colony was afterwards under-
taken by the F.M.S. Railway. While the F.M.S. Railway directed the pro-
jects, state governments typically financed them. When rail construction
over-taxed state budgets, colonial governments stepped in with loans.52
Construction required not only a tremendous expenditure of money but
also workers. The division of labor fell along ethnic lines. High-ranking
officials were of European descent and construction was carried out by
Chinese and Malay workers." During the opening ceremony of the Klang-
Kuala Lumpur Line in 1886, Mr. Roger, the Resident of the State of Selan-
gor, thanked "two of the principal members of our Chinese community, the
Captain China, and Towkay Ah Yok, who, on recently hearing that there
was great difficulty in obtaining a sufficient labor force, came forward in
the most public spirited manner and supplied the government with 300 min-
ing coolies. ' '54 In providing assistance, Chinese leaders drew from their
mining workforce, inspiring Mr. Rogers to commend them for providing
workers "at a time when such assistance was of the utmost value in acceler-
ating the progress of the works, and although the removal of so large a body
of men from the mines must have caused them serious inconvenience, more
47 id.
48 Id.
49 See the Railway Ordinance, Malayan Union No. 8 (1948).




14 Id. at 10.
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especially having regard to the present high price of tin."" Ultimately, the
Chinese leaders profited from the railways that facilitated quicker and more
efficient shipment of tin.
To meet this need, the construction and operation of railways also re-
quired technical expertise. Engineers were contracted from London.
5 6
Also, technical skills were necessary to run a railway. For this reason the
government invested in educational institutions in proto-Malaysia, founding
the Government Technical School, a two-year program. In addition, an ex-
tensive apprenticeship programme was instituted, comprising a five-year
training course at the Central Workshops and evening classes in machine
drawing and workshop mechanics. 7
Railway construction involved the coordination of political jurisdic-
tions within proto-Malaysia. In addition, the projects had to contend with
many of the risks typical of present-day project finance endeavours. For
example, an economic crisis in 1921 meant aborting a segment of the rail-
way and a planned hotel at one of the rail stops." In addition, environ-
mental risks were faced. Floods were inevitable and caused loss of human
lives and property damage.59
Commercial development of the colonies also involved the building of
ports to transport goods. The F.M.S. Railway built, owned and operated a
number of ports in proto-Malaysia. These ports included Port Weld, Klang,
Port Swettenham, Port Dickson, Tumpat, Kota Bharu, Palekbang and
Penang. As technological developments allowed, several ports were up-
graded from wood to steel superstructures. 60 Many of the same infrastruc-ture concerns manifest in proto-Malaysia recur during the present era.
II. HIGH TECH INFRASTRUCTURE
Despite the rhetoric of newness and virtual existence, the information
economy depends upon physical infrastructure. Telecommunications and
satellites, for instance, are required for information to travel from one com-
puter to another. While discussion of infrastructure is often limited to fibre-
optic cables, telephone lines, satellite feeds and cellular telephones, these
connectors are just the tip of the iceberg. For example, not all high tech-
nology goods travel over the Internet. In e-commerce transactions, while
contracts may be entered into and payment transfers occur over the Internet,
the promised goods must often be physically delivered from the buyer to
the seller. This delivery depends upon well-functioning and efficient trans-
55 Id.
56 Id. at 11.
7 Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 47.
59Id. at 49-51.
60 Id. at 51-53.
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portation systems, including airports, roads and seaports. In addition,
manufacturing of the goods in the first place requires infrastructure. This
infrastructure is traditional and includes power plants and factories. In
many developing countries historically reliant on natural resource extrac-
tion, power supplies are severely inadequate. Also, workers must be trained
to staff factories. As a country moves up on the international high tech
value chain, labor needs change. To meet these new needs, governments
must train knowledgeable workers. This training requires staffing univer-
sity departments, promoting worker training abroad and an incentive
scheme to ensure that foreign-trained workers return home.
Developing countries often lack the necessary expertise or pools of fi-
nance capital to create infrastructure for the new economy. In the U.S.,
much of the research spurring infrastructure development has taken place
within the universities. During the Cold War, the government invested tre-
mendous amounts of money in university science departments. The result
was the Internet, innovations in telecommunications and advances in aero-
plane development. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, gov-
ernments began to privatise and increasingly promote the
commercialisation of these Cold War public goods. Thus, privatization in
the U.S. involved not only the transfer of public services and the recession
of the welfare state, but also the placing of public research and development
assets into private hands.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.K. and U.S. embarked on pri-
vatization programmes. Through privatization, the provision of previously
government-provided public services was transferred into private hands.
Telephone companies, roads, prisons and a range of other publicly owned
and controlled services were privatized. Privatization not only provided
companies with the opportunity to turn a profit from public service, but it
also meant that increasingly publicly-financed and publicly-held research
and development assets were placed in private hands. Thus, expertise that
had accumulated throughout the Cold War to fuel the military industry
could be sold on the open market. While the public at large had financed a
tremendous accumulation of wealth in the form of technology, it was now
disproportionately controlled by a small group of private companies.
Privatization was not a one-off deal in the 1980s. The growth of the
military during the Cold War occurred through a range of legal mecha-
nisms. Often through licensing and subsidies, governments invested in pri-
vate firms and universities. Agreements sometimes stipulated that
technology produced by public funds would be owned by the government.
However, frequently, the right to pursue commercial applications for the
subsidised technology remained in private hands. This commercialisation
of high technology products accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s.
As companies consolidated domestic holdings and matured business
plans, contemporaneous privatizations began abroad in developing coun-
tries. Ownership or control of many of the same industries transferred into
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private hands. Importantly, developing countries did not possess the exper-
tise of their modernised counterparts so privatization in developing coun-
tries involved not only the transfer of assets but also the transfer of
monopoly rights over the provision of yet-to-be-built public services into
private hands.61 For example, if a country did not possess a satellite of its
own, privatization could not involve the transfer of pre-existing satellites.
Instead, the power to build, control, sometimes own and certainly to profit
from a to-be-built satellite transferred into private hands.
Since expertise in high tech infrastructure resided primarily in the
hands of companies in Europe, Japan and the U.S., privatization in develop-
ing countries included a foreign component. Newly created or commercial-
ised companies in developing countries sought the expertise of foreign
companies to build telecommunications lines, to launch satellites and to
construct airports. So, privatization and globalization travelled together.
As a country privatized an industry, it purposively opened itself up to for-
eign companies. Since foreign companies were the primary repository of
infrastructure expertise, developing countries ran a risk of foreign-ising
their public sector through privatization programs.
To hedge against the possibility of a wholesale transfer of public assets
to foreign private hands, developing countries instituted a range of legal
mechanisms to control privatization processes. Counter to the rhetoric of
privatization, the process was not simply the transfer of ownership from
public to private hands. Ownership transfers might be only partial, and they
included changes in equity, limited term concessions agreements and a shift
to a stock market intermediary. Often, ownership was retained and the
transfer was of control through contract or licensing. For instance, in Ma-
laysia, the government retains a "right of compulsory acquisition" over pri-
vatization projects.62 Nonetheless, privatization is often presented as afait
accompli with public ownership transferred to private hands in one legisla-
tive act. An understanding of the actual legal mechanisms employed in pri-
vatization is necessary to judge the reality of the privatization rhetoric.63
Malaysia's privatization process involves a tremendous array of legal
mechanisms. Shortly after privatization in the U.K. and the U.S., Malaysia
initiated its privatization policy in 1983. 4 Malaysia was one of the first de-
veloping countries to embark on privatization. It also has been an innovator
in privatization techniques. Further, the success of Malaysia in nurturing a
high technology economy has been facilitated by this now decades old pri-
6 1 This approach resembles the newly-independent states' approach to planning.
62 "Malaysia" (9/1994) Project and Trade Finance 84.
63 See Meredith M Brown Privatisation: A Foretaste of the Book in Meredith M Brown
and G Ridley, (eds.), PRIVATISATION: CURRENT ISSUES (1994) xv. For a nuanced definition
in the UK context see CG Veljanovski SELLING THE STATE: PRIVATISATION IN BRITAIN
(1987).
64 Privatization Master Plan, 1988.
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vatization process. Current studies on the information economy do not
adequately account for the place of these privatizations of the 1980s and the
role of law therein.
In 1983, the Prime Minister announced Malaysia Inc. as the principle
that would guide the country's orientation towards national development.
Malaysia Inc. was an explicit reference to Japan Inc., a term derogatorily
applied to the Japanese approach to development during the 1970s." The
concept was a component of a broader Look East Policy initiated by the
Prime Minister.66 This Policy was premised on emulating the successful
development policies of Japan. According to Jomo K. S., the strategy was
more cynical: "The real thrust of the campaign appears to be the promotion
of labor discipline through organising industrial relations to promote com-
pany loyalty (e.g. propaganda campaigns, company welfarism, in-house un-
ions), increase productivity (e.g. work ethics, more 'incentive payments')
and reduce losses (e.g. quality control circles, 'zero defect' groups).
This framing of the country's approach to economic development with
an eastern hue also underpins the public international law controversy over
universal human rights and Asian values.
Malaysia was one of the first developing countries to institute a priva-
tization process and has been a global leader in innovative financing tech-
niques. Malaysia Inc. conceives of the relationship between the public and
private sectors as based on close collaboration and mutual understanding."
Through strategic partnership, the two sectors cohere into one giant corpo-
ration. This oligarchic concept also provides an indication of Malaysia's
approach to privatization. By employing the Malaysia Inc. concept, Malay-
sia makes clear that, even when a public good is transferred into private
hands, the government will continue to play a proactive regulatory role on
behalf of the privatized industry.69 Mahathir described the functions of the
government under Vision 2020:
The government will be proactive to ensure healthy fiscal and monetary man-
agement and the smooth functioning of the Malaysian economy. It will esca-
late the development of the necessary physical infrastructure and the most
conducive business environment - consistent with its other social priorities.
65 MAHATHIR MOHAMAD A NEW DEAL FOR AsIA (1999).
66 The Look East Policy and its relationship to social developments in Malaysia is dis-
cussed at length in the political science literature. See, e.g., Richard Robinson and David
S.G. Goodman, The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political
Consciousness, in THE NEW RICH IN ASIA: MOBILE PHONES, McDONALD'S AND MIDDLE
CLASs REVOLUTION I (Richard Robinson & David S. G. Goodman eds., 1996); MICHAEL R.
J. VATIKIOTIS, POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRIMMING THE BANYAN TREE (1996).
67 K.S. JOMO, GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY 203
(1990).
68 MAHATHIR MOHAMAD A NEW DEAL FOR ASIA (1999).
69 K.S. Jomo Privatization, in MALAYSIA'S ECONOMY IN THE NINETIES 203 (1994).
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And where absolutely necessary the government will not be so completely
bound by its commitment to withdraw from the economic role, that it will not
intervene. It will play its role judiciously and actively.7
The government typically retains an ownership share in the privatized en-
terprises and benefits from a thirty-five percent tax on all enterprise.71
From independence in 1957 until the initiation of privatization in 1983,
the government carried out public sector projects using public enterprises.7 2
Prior to the initiation of its Malaysia, Inc. concept, compound companies in
Malaysia were generally public corporations proper. With the shift to Ma-
laysia, Inc., compound corporations persisted albeit with a different compo-
sition. The Malaysian government has established compound corporations
to carry out a range of enterprises. These enterprises exist in many sectors
of the economy, including, agriculture, banking, commerce, finance, indus-
try, primary industries, and public utilities.74 Under the National Economic
Policy, the government established public corporations for the purpose of
redistributing economic opportunity to the Bumiputras. 75  These federal16
government ventures are typically either statutory bodies or government
70 MAHATHIR, Inauguration Speech of the Malaysian Business Council, in MALAYSIA'S
VISION 2020: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT, IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES, 397, 410-411
(A. Sarji ed., 1997).
71 Privatization Master Plan, 1988.
72 See M.P. JAIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 827-850 (3rd ed.
1997).
73 The actions of these companies have a legislative quality and may be viewed as an in-
stance of subsidiary legislation. Subsidiary legislation is "any order in council, proclama-
tion, rule, regulation, order, notification, by-law, or other instrument made under any
Ordinance, Enactment, or other lawful authority and having legislative effect." Interpreta-
tion and General Clauses Act, No. 7-88 (1948) (Malayan Union).
74 JAIN, supra note 64, at 445.
75 This was the rationale for establishing Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS) in
1969. PERNAS was a private company registered in 1969. It was a joint enterprise formed
by the government and several other governmental bodies. The purpose was to promote the
participation of Malays in industry. In order to carry out this mission, PERNAS established
a number of subsidiary companies. By 1976 there were 64 subsidiary companies. Id. at
443-44.
76 For instance, Bintulu Port Sdn Bhd, The Commodities Trading Commission, Employ-
ees Provident Fund, Farmers Organisation Authority, Federal Agricultural Marketing Au-
thority, Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority, Federal Land
Development Authority, Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia, Forest Research In-
stitute of Malaysia, Johor Port Authority, Klang Port Authority, The Kuala Lumpur Com-
modity Exchange, Kuala Lumpur Future Market, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Kuantan
Port Authority, Kuching Port Authority, Malaysia Agricultural Research and Development
Institute, The Malaysian Cocoa Board, Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation,
The Malaysian Highway Authority, Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, Malaysian
Pineapple Industry Board, Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation, Malaysian Rubber
Exchange and Licencing Board, Malaysian Rubber Research and Development Board, Ma-
laysian Timber Industry Board, The Mines Research Institute, National Tobacco Board,
Palm Oil Registration and Licencing Authority, Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia,
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owned or controlled corporations.77 In addition many state statutory bodies
are in existence, enabled by a federal act, the Incorporation (State Legisla-
tures Competency) Act of 196278, which empowers state governments to es-
tablish public corporations. 79 Ultimately, however, these corporations are
formally under the control of the federal government.
80
Public corporations are created either through an act of Parliament or
under the Companies Act. When established by statute, oversight mecha-
nisms are provided through the terms of the constitution and company fi-
nancing. Those corporations requiring funds from Parliament must notify
Parliament of estimates of expenditures, and of major capital expenditures,
and also to submit annual reports.8' When a company is incorporated under
private law, government control is generally exercised through private law
ownership mechanisms. Public corporations are generally granted a num-
ber of advantages. If the company is entrusted with carrying out a particu-
lar commercial or industrial activity, then it may be granted monopoly
rights. To encourage efficiency, public corporations may hire their employ-
ees under private law, Thus, they are exempt from civil servant require-
ments,82 but liable under contract and tort.
83
Penang Port Sdn Bhd, Pepper Marketing Board, Pilgrims Management and Fund Board,
Railway Asset Corporation, Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority, Rubber
Research Institute of Malaysia, Sabah Electricity Board, Sarawak Electricity Supply Corpo-
ration, Securities Commission, Tin Industry (Research and Development) Board, & Urban
Development Authority.
77 For instance, KTM Berhad, Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad, Ma-
laysian Industrial Estates Sdn Bhd, Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad,
Malaysian Technology Development Corporation Sdn Bhd, MIMOS Berhad, National
Paddy and Rice Company Limited, Petroleum Nasional Berhad, Pos Malaysia Berhad,
Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad, & Tenaga Nasional Berhad.
78 Incorporation (State Legislatures Competency) Act, No. 15-3 (1962). (Fdn. of Ma-
laysa).
7 These include, Johor Corporation-En. 4 of 1968, Kedah State Development Corpora-
tion-En. 5 of 1965, Kelantan State Economic Development Corporation - En. 10 of 1966,
Malacca State Development Corporation-En. I of 1971, Negeri Sembilan Development
Corporation-En. 4 of 1969, Pahang State Development Corporation-En. 12 of 1965,
Penang Development Corporation-En. 10 of 1971, Perak State Development Corpora-
tion-En. 3 of 1967, Perlis State Economic Development Corporation-En. 6 of 1973, Se-
langor State Development Corporation-En. 4 of 1964, Terengganu State Economic
Development Corporation-En. 3 of 1965, Sabah Economic Development Corporation-En.
21 of 1981 & Perbadanan Pembangunan Ekonomi Sarawak-Cap. 35.
80 The federal government may exercise control over these state corporations in a variety
of manners. The Prime Minister appoints three federal representatives as members of the
respective corporation. Incorporation (State Legislatures Competency) Act 1962, Act 380,
Second Schedule (5). The Minister of Finance also exercises influence on activities involv-
ing assets and investment and borrowing. Id. at (13) & (14) respectively.
81 R.H. HICKLING, MALAYSIAN PUBLIC LAW 211 (1996).
82 Civil servant requirements are laid out in Part X of the Constitution.
83 HICKLING, supra note 73 at 213.
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In Malaysia, oversight of public corporations is limited in a number of
respects. For a company created by an act of Parliament, most of the con-
trol is exercised at the point of inception. However, once the company is
created, the exercise of control becomes more difficult. Although ministers
are often granted powers over the companies by statute, once the company
is formed, the relevant minister is not responsible to parliament for its ac-
tions. Oversight is limited to broad policy issues and does not extend to the
daily operations of the company. However, the Minister does retain certain
rights. Since the Minister may have the power to appoint members to the
board of the company, she also has the power to remove them.84 The Minis-
ter does retain a number of powers over the direction of the public corpora-
tion, but rarely exercises them. Intervention by the Minister is generally
limited to regulations made for the company or to approve the regulations
made by the company."
Since the mandate of a company is typically stated in broad terms, ju-
dicial oversight is rarely exercised. At creation, public corporations are
given a fair degree of latitude. The rationale for this latitude is to provide
the necessary flexibility for commercial endeavours. Although an order of
mandamus could apply to enforce duties, the vagueness of the constitution
generally forecloses this possibility because of the difficulty in determining
concrete duties.86
In Malaysia, the courts have rarely treated the issue of the legal status
and privileges and liabilities of public enterprises. However, in a 1993 Su-
preme Court case, the Court enumerated the rationale for establishing such
enterprises:
The main reason for vesting of ownership of any form of industries, public
utilities, industrial and commercial enterprises in statutory bodies ... instead of
continuing to bring them within the framework of normal departmental ad-
ministration is to encourage a competitive spirit of initiative and enterprise.
The civil service ethos, would, it was thought, inhibit the managerial staff of
the industry enterprises from making untried experiments in new fields, it
would induce an excess of caution and addiction of precedents, all manner of
orders and circulars. Officials would always be looking over their shoulders,
apprehensive of parliamentary inquisition in the form of examination of ex-
penditure before the public accounts committee or the auditor-general.87
14 Id. at 213, n. 135.
85 HICKLING, supra note 73 at 213.
86 Id.
87 Penang Development Corporation v. Teoh Eng Huat & Anor, [1993] MLJ 97 (Su-
preme Court (Kuala Lumpur)) 54-55. R. H. Hickling makes a similar point regarding
public corporations in Malaysia:
If the public corporation is to engage in commercial activities, it can employ its own
staff, employees who are outside the scope of Part X of the Constitution. In this man-
ner, the corporation is free of the red tape and bureaucracy common to the civil service,
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The Court went on to state the principles, which must guide the activi-
ties of these companies:
All statutory bodies are expected to conduct their affairs in a business-like
manner and carry out their undertakings as commercial and industrial under-
takings, operating in the public interest, and to be self-supporting over a period
of time. In brief, the corporation has to be business-minded and the thinking
must be business-orientated in order to survive and succeed in the competitive
world of business and should not depend on government grants throughout for
their expenditure and survival. 88
Although the courts have not explicitly addressed whether these ex-
emptions from public law scrutiny and requirements are legally valid, this
passage seems to suggest so.
In effect then, the executive branch has succeeded in placing these
governmental actions outside of the public control. (Of course, private en-
terprises are nonetheless regulated, and must adhere to a litany of govern-
mental requirements.) At the same time, as the High Court in Penang notes,
since these companies are profit-making and thus accountable to the expec-
tations of their shareholders, they must "take their place like any other
company under the Malaysian sun.,, 89 The sparse case law on this matter
suggests that public corporations are not popular plaintiffs or defendants in
court. Further, when disputes arise, the courts typically address discrete
claims against the corporations and do not strike at the heart of the activities
undertaken.
According to the government's Second Outline Perspective Plan, a
shift occurred away from public enterprises with privatization:
The impetus of the rapid growth achieved during the decade of the Seventies
came as a result of a high level of public sector involvement in the economy.
Such a high public sector profile arose from the need to continue with the so-
cial and physical infrastructure begun since Independence. It also arose be-
cause of the overriding need to achieve the objectives of the NEP in the face of
a comparatively underdeveloped private sector. As a result, public sector in-
vestment as a proportion of total investment increased steadily from 32 per
cent in 1970 to a peak of 50 per cent by 1982. Despite improvements in the
domestic savings rate, the increasingly high level of such investments had to
be financed by external debt.
While we have been successful in achieving growth targets and in meeting
many of the country's socio-economic goals, dependence on the public sector
was found to be unsustainable. In addition, high public sector involvement in
and can therefore act with greater expedition and (it might be hoped) efficiency.
HICKLING, supra note 73, at 212.
88 Id. at 55.




direct productive activities, especially by the non-fimancial public enterprises
had not yielded the results that were expected of them. Indeed their perform-
ance in most instances was dismal, very much the way state-run enterprises in
other countries disappointed their protagonists.
90
So the privatization strategy has been devoted not only to transferring
government-owned enterprises to the private sector,91 but also to developing
a private sector. As Mahathir put it, "today we consider the public and pri-
vate sectors as a team that work together to develop the country." 92
Although it is not a socialist country, Malaysia does have a planned
economy. Governments in planned economies issue regular national devel-
opment plans. Since independence in 1956, the Malaysian government has
issued two long-term plans, called Outline Perspective Plans, for the years
1971-1990 and 1991-2000. The National Economic Policy was a corner-
stone of the First Outline Perspective Plan. In 1969 ethnic riots in Malay-
sia resulted in a declaration of national emergency and the instituting of the
Policy, which was an affirmative action programme designed to accomplish
the wholesale redistribution of wealth within the society. With the Second
Outline Perspective Plan, the National Development Policy has superceded
the National Economic Policy. This Development Policy continues to carry
out the redistribution goals of its predecessor but also puts forth the gov-
ernment's Vision 2020 Plan. Vision 2020 lays out the path to fully devel-
oped nation status, which the country hopes to achieve by the year 2020.94
Several developing countries have imitated Malaysia's Vision 2020 Plan,
including Botswana, El Salvador, Colombia, Nigeria and Venezuela. 95
As components of its Outline Perspective Plans, the government issues
sub-plans. During the course of the Second Outline Perspective Plan, the
government issued the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans, covering
1991-1995 and 1996-2000 respectively. All of these plans are conceived in
the executive branch. The Economic Planning Unit is responsible for draft-
ing the plans, with the Implementation and Coordination Unit in charge of
operationalizing the plans.9 6 Many of the ties between the public and pri-
vate sectors are formally integrated through the Malaysian Business Coun-
90 M. Mohamad, The Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000 in MALAYSIA'S VISION
2020: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT, IMPLICATIONS, AND CHALLENGES 420 (Relenduk Pub-
lications ed., 1997).
91 See M.P. JAIN Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore, 3 Malayan L.J. 853,
853-861 (1997).
92 Quoted in A.A. Rahman 'The Malaysia Incorporated Concept' in Asian Strategy and
Leadership Institute, in MALAYSIA TODAY: TOWARDS THE NEW MILLENNIUM 49, 55 (ASEAN
Academic P. London ed., 1997).
93 MAHATHIR 19971 499.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 MOHAMAD, supra note 82, at 21.
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cil. The Prime Minister established the Council in 1991 at the inception of
the Second Outline Perspective Plan .
In 1985, Malaysia issued the Guidelines on Privatisation that would di-
rect the process and set forth modes of implementation.98 This document
initiated a dramatic overhaul of the domestic legislative environment to fa-
cilitate a shift to private sector-led growth. Controversies surrounding pri-
vatization projects led the government to issue and disseminate publicly a
Privatisation Master Plan in June of 1988.
Foreign actors played a significant role in producing this Plan.99 The
British government provided funding and a team of international account-
ants, bankers and lawyers drafted the Plan.'0 0 It assesses past privatizations
and then discusses future trends. In doing so, the Plan outlines the various
legal mechanisms employed to undertake privatization. However, it does
not identify these mechanisms as law per se, instead relegating the designa-
tion 'law' to passive regulatory measures.
The Malaysian government defines privatization as "the transfer to the
private sector of activities and functions which have traditionally rested in
the public sector."' 01 Privatized projects range from the transfer of pre-
existing public enterprises into private hands to the creation of new enter-
prises in pursuit of what would previously have been considered public sec-
tor projects.
Malaysia employs a number of legal mechanisms to effectuate privati-
zation, including sale of assets or equity, lease of assets, management con-
tracts, corporatization, build-operate-transfer and build-operate
techniques.'0 Often several of these techniques are employed in a single
instance of privatization. Also, synergies develop among privatization pro-
jects. Privatization requires amending pre-existing laws, employment of
private company law, granting government licenses and issuing executive
decrees.
The sale of assets or equity involves transferring management respon-
sibilities, assets and personnel. Often sales result in a partial privatization
and allow a certain percentage of foreign equity ownership. Wo3 The gov-
ernment encourages the sales also as a way of promoting the growth of the
national stock markets.' 4 Many of the companies sold are required to list
themselves on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
97 Id.
98 Guidelines on Privatisation, 1985.
99 Privatization Master Plan, 1988 Introduction paragraph [3].
'0 0 Id. at 3.
101 Id. at Conceptual Framework, Number 19.
Id. at 35.
03Id. at 36.
10 4 Id. at 49-50.
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The lease of assets involves the fixed term transfer of assets away from
the government. This privatization mechanism is concerned with control
over assets rather than ownership, as the government retains the ownership
interest throughout the privatization period. Also, the ultimate end point of
this privatization mechanism is public ownership and control. To raise to
the level of privatization, transfers must involve significant amounts of as-
sets. The government has privatized seaports and airports through this legal
mechanism. 10 5
Management contracts, also known as "contracting-in," involve the
hiring of outside professional managers to run state enterprises. Like the
lease, this technique effectuates transfers of control not ownership. The
amount of control transferred depends upon the relationship between man-
agers and the sole shareholders and board of directors of the public enter-
prise. Typically the shareholder is the government and the board of
directors comprises a blend of public and private actors."06
Many of Malaysia's high profile privatization projects have been
undertaken through a mix of BOT and build-operate techniques. Malaysia
was the first Southeast Asian country to use these techniques for undertak-
ing large-scale projects. Like the lease and management techniques, BOT
and build-operate technique involve a fixed term transfer of control. These
techniques are used to undertake projects with no pre-existing material as-
sets. The government grants a license to the project company conferring
monopoly powers. For instance, the government might grant a private indi-
vidual the right to build a road. Although no pre-existing material assets
exist, these licenses are tremendously valuable goods. Their value derives
from expectation of profits and the scarcity of licenses. 10 7 Under the BOT
technique, the project company builds the facility, is granted a concession
to operate it for a period and then must transfer the built facility in good
condition to the government. During the concession period, the project
company recoups sunk costs and extracts a profit. The projects undertaken
typically involve public utilities or roads for which a guaranteed customer
base exists.
These privatization techniques are carried out through amendments of
statutes, regulatory action and executive law-making. For instance, the Ma-
laysian government has amended the Pensions Act, 1980, the Telecommuni-
cations Act, 1950, the College and Universities Act, the Port Authorities
Act, 1963 and many other laws.'08 In addition, regulatory frameworks have
been dramatically transformed to encourage market forces. Also, through
licensing, the awarding of state contracts, granting of incentives, creation of
05 Id. at 37.
106 Id. at 38.
107 Id. at 39.
"o8Id. at 47.
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publicly-backed private companies and a number of other techniques, the
executive branch has used its discretionary powers to drive much of the pri-
vatization process. Further privatization has often been subsumed under
preexisting patronage arrangements. E. T. Gomez and K.S. Jomo note:
Given the highly politicised access to business opportunities for Malaysia's
corporate sector since the 1980s with UMNO's enhanced political hegemony,
the privatisation policy was bound to have an impact on politics. Some
claimed that the private sector--and not the public enterprises--now the main
vehicle for economic development, political influence on the economy through
public enterprise, especially for patronage, would be checked. This argument
is flawed. Substantial corporate stock had been captured through political pa-
tronage and was controlled by an elite few connected with one UMNO leader-
ship by the late 1980s; this often also ensured privileged and continued access
to patronage, especially with privatisation; thereby reinforcing their positions
in the party and in business. Politicians who had exploited their political influ-
ence to help businessmen expand their corporate interests and those who had
cultivated close ties with members of the business community found they had
an advantage over other aspiring politicians, especially during elections. As
Craig has noted, given its rather unique 'political/bureaucratic/business com-
plex', privatisation in Malaysia is unlikely to be more than a rearrangement of
economic and political power.109
The following sections examine several facilitative infrastructure pro-
jects, including real estate, airports, stock exchanges, expressways and
communication.
A. Real Estate
The development of the MSC requires transforming oil and palm es-
tates into the fifteen by forty kilometre high technology corridor. To do so,
land must be cleared and construction projects undertaken on an ambitious
scale. To expedite the process, the Prime Minister's Office issued a certifi-
cate of urgency, nationalising private and state lands under the National
Land Code. Most of the land was owned by the state government of Selan-
gor, which became a major stakeholder in Cyberview Holdings, along with
the largest private sector real estate holder in the region, Golden Hope Plan-
tations.
Cyberview Holdings is a publicly incorporated company, with a range
of public and private owners. It handles real estate investment within the
MSC and is responsible for developing Cyberjaya, an MSC smart city and
the new site for the Malaysian government. A compound company, this
real estate holding company is an international consortium comprised of
Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd (55%), Japan's Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
(15%), Golden Hope Plantation Bhd (15%), Parmodakan Nasional Bhd
109 E.T. GOMEZ AND K.S. JOMO, MALAYSIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY: POLITICS, PATRONAGE
AND PROFITS 81 (Cambridge UP New York 1997).
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(5%), the Selangor State government (5%) and the Multimedia Media De-
velopment Corporation (10%)."1° Foreign participation in the company
helps attract international capital. The participation of Japan's Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone provides high profile legitimacy and makes the
real estate development consortium a more attractive destination for foreign
finance money. Similarly, foreign and domestic actors are involved in air-
port construction within the Corridor.
B. Airports
Realizing that the Corridor must be linked to major world cities, the
government decided to build the Kuala Lumpur International Airport, re-
ferred to as KLIA. International airports are a central feature of the high
technology development plan. Integrating Malaysia into the transnational
commercial order depends upon mobility of persons and goods. While
shipping remains an important means of transport, airports facilitate the
speed of travel necessary in the faster paced high technology economy. The
faith in the promise of air transport was reaffirmed during the East Asian
currency crisis. Investment in airports did not dry up during the crisis and
investors aggressively sought new opportunities in this sector at the time.
11I
The sustained support for airports by the project finance community
throughout the crisis reflected a confidence in the long-term prospects of
the East Asian region." 12
Traditionally airports have been publicly owned and operated. Since
the 1980s airports around the world have been privatized. Through privati-
zations, airports have dramatically transformed their internal organization
and operation.' 1 3 At the same time, new airports have been constructed in-
ternationally. 14 Airport privatizations proceed through a range of legal
means including public ownership and operations with commercial orienta-
tion, regional ownership and operations, public ownership with private op-
erators (joint ventures, partial/majority divestitures, management contracts,
build-operate-transfer, etc.) and private ownership and private operations."5
To accomplish the KLIA, both foreign know-how and capital were re-
quired. Once again, foreign direct investment and project finance went
110 See generally, V. Ho, Mahathir Opens Malaysia's Silicon Valley, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, July 8, 1999. I found this source on LEXIS so there were not page numbers.
111 Mary Watkins, Asia's Near Miss, PROJECT FINANCE, January 7, 1988, at 43.
112 P. Bennett, A New Thirst for Energy, PROJECT FINANCE, January 8, 1999, at 29.
113 On airport privatization, see e.g. D.N. Powers and L.A. Freiman, Airport Privatiza-
tion: A New Frontier in Project Finance, February 1999, Practicing Law Institute: Corporate
Law and Practice Handbook Series (PLI Order No. BO-OOGZ).
114 0. Betancor and R. Rendeiro, Regulating Privatized Infrastructures and Airport Ser-
vices, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2180 at 12 (Governance, Regulation, and
Finance, World Bank Institute, Washington, D.C. (1999)).
"5 Id. at 14-15.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:1 (2001)
hand in hand. The Malaysian government awarded airport-building con-
tracts and provided a good deal of the project financing. Importantly, it also
furnished executive backing by awarding the contract in the first place. The
government signed a contract with an international consortium, comprising
Tamen Corporation, a Japanese company; Sapura Holdings, Sdn Bhd, a
Malaysian company; and Harris Airport System, an American company.
Money for this project came from Malaysian sources, Japanese soft money
and Islamic banks. The laws facilitating this financing come from many
legal traditions and systems and were coordinated for the purpose of the
project. Further, the Malaysian government, through guaranteed loans
committed support to the endeavour. This support meant the aid of a
friendly state regulator. To ensure close government involvement in the
project, the International Airport Berhad was established. This public com-
pound company was responsible "for the construction and commissioning
of the airport. '' "
C. Stock Exchanges
The success of Malaysia's infrastructure projects relies in part on the
strength of the country's domestic capital market. Many of its large projects
are sourced domestically. During the East Asian currency crisis, the coun-
try's ability to sustain many of the projects resulted from their domestic
portfolio.1 18 The fact that projects were financed using domestic currency
meant international exchange rate fluctuations devaluing local currency did
not affect project financing adversely. In fact foreign banks were able to
purchase Malaysian projects at a discounted rate during the crisis. The
strength of the domestic capital markets is a recent phenomenon, the result
of a government strategy designed to make Malaysia's economy less reliant
on foreign capital markets. 19
In addition to Malaysia's unusually strong domestic capital market, it
has also been a leader in Islamic project financing. 20 As a result, Malaysia
has funded many projects in part through Middle Eastern investments.
Malaysia's domestic investments are dominated by the Employee
Provident Fund, a government controlled retirement scheme with a manda-
116 K. Richards, New Airports; New Challenges, AIRPORT REV., January 1, 1999.
117 Id.
" 8 Malaysia, PROJECT AND TRADE FINANCE, September 1994, at 84.
119 L.S. Hoon, The Gradation of Malaysian Banks, PROJECT AND TRADE FINANCE, July
1995, at 36.
120 On Islamic financing, see G. Bilal, Islamic Finance: Alternatives to the Western
Model, 23 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 145 (1999).
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tory contribution by Malaysian workers of 10% of their income. 121 The
government used the fund to rescue troubled projects during the crisis.
22
A successful capital market depends upon the creation of secondary
markets. If an investment begins to falter, company debt is often sold at a
discounted rate. The ability of a company to make regular payments to its
financiers is often uncertain in the project finance field. Since many project
finance deals require tremendous outlays of capital and involve taking large
risks, project payments sometimes are not forthcoming. Even if a project is
unable to make payments, value may still reside in the project. Interested
investors determine the residual value of the project and purchase the debt
from the initial investor at an agreed price. Purchases often occur through
derivative markets. For this reason, Malaysia has developed derivatives, or
secondary, markets.
123
For a secondary market to function efficiently, independent ratings
agencies must be established to value debt. Realising this need, the Malay-
sian government established two ratings agencies. The Ratings Agency
Malaysia is charged with rating infrastructure projects. 124 In 1995, Malay-
sia established the Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futures Ex-
change. 125 Also, it is in the process of establishing a secondary market in
Labuan, an offshore banking haven.126 In addition, the government is ex-
perimenting with a dollar-based secondary market.22 This market will in-
clude an Islamic secondary market. 12  Malaysia has funded road building
through its domestic capital markets.
29
D. Expressways
Whilst commentators often convey the image of the information econ-
omy as timeless and de-territorialised, the functioning of the Internet re-
quires traditional infrastructure such as roads. For example, as mentioned
earlier, while e-commerce transactions occur over the Internet, purchased
goods must be shipped from the seller to the buyer. Also, the mobility of
121 Id.
122 L.S. Hoon, Malaysia Tests the Boundaries, PROJECT AND TRADE FINANCE, July 1995,
at 32, 33. Throughout the crisis Malaysia retained a high sovereign rating. D. Simpson,
Asia Pacific Overview, PROJECT FINANCE, March 2000, at 7.
123 Ministry of Finance Economic Report 1998/99 183-184 (1998).
124 R. Kelsey, Malaysian Project Finance Trades Up, PROJECT AND TRADE FINANCE, May
1996, at 36.
125 Ministry of Finance Economic Report 1998/99 (1998).
126 See Michael S. Bennett Banking Deregulation in Indonesia 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
443, 474-475 (1995).
127 K. T. Tan The Breath of Life MALAYSIAN BUSINESS November 1, 1999.
128 See generally, Political Uncertainty Casts Shadow over Upbeat Economic Outlook
INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKETING, June 6, 2001.
129 HENRY A. DAVIS, Malaysian North-South Expressway, in PROJECT FINANCE:
PRACTICAL CASE STUDIES 199 ((Beverly Lester ed., Euromoney Publications PLC 1996).
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the workforce depends upon an adequate transportation system. Before the
1980s the road system of Peninsular Malaysia was substandard.
Realising the need for a well-functioning road in its development
plans, in 1988 the government began constructing an expressway. In the
early 1980s the government established the Malaysian Highway Authority,
a compound company, to carry out the planning and building of a road. As
the road was being constructed a young Malaysian entrepreneur proposed
the idea of a more extensive transportation project. Under his plan, the road
would run the entire length of Peninsular Malaysia from Thailand to Singa-
pore. 130
The tendering process raised eyebrows in Malaysia. This entrepreneur
submitted a proposal to the government. Under the government's privatiza-
tion policy at the time, if the government was interested in the proposed
project, it granted a six-month period during which the applicant could de-
velop a project exclusively. Due to controversies surrounding the tendering
process of the North-South Expressway, the government changed its policy.
Before this change, the interested party proposed the privatization of a cer-
tain industry or sector. Now, the government first identifies the areas tar-
geted for privatization and then proposals are submitted. According to the
government, "This will enable interested parties to study and make offers
which will be considered on the basis of comparative merit."' 131 Further,
while previously the interested party was granted a period of exclusivity
during which to hone his or her proposal, the new privatization guidelines
marked a shift. Now, exclusivity will be exceptional and, even when
granted, conditions will be placed upon it.
132
The applicant who submitted the tender had strong connections with
the Prime Minister's Office and his company, United Engineers. United
Engineers was a sub-corporation of Hatibuti Sdn Bhd, a company owned by
the ruling party coalition, UMNO. The applicant had no track record in
construction projects and used his political connections as currency to es-
tablish an international consortium with more experienced contractors.
This consortium included Mitsui (Japan), Taylor Woodrow (UK) and Dra-
gages (France). Together they submitted the tender. Also, foreign advisers
were hired to oversee the engineering and toll roads operation. In addition,
Morgan Grenfell of the UK was retained as a financial adviser, 33 working
with the Malaysian Commerce International Merchant Bankers.
134
130 Id.
131 Privatization Master Plan 1988.
132 Privatization Master Plan 1988, Foreword.
133 Henry A. Davis, supra note 132, at 201.
134 L.S. Hoon, The Gradation of Malaysian Banks, PROJECT AND TRADE FINANCE 36 (July




By internationalizing the tender and including experts in a number of
fields, this young entrepreneur was successful in capitalizing on his reputa-
tion and legitimating his application. 13' Given the size of the project and
the potentially controversial awarding of the contract to an inexperienced
and politically connected entrepreneur, the executive decided that the pro-
ject should be submitted to an open tender process. A four-month period
was granted. However, this entrepreneur retained a competitive advantage
because he had strong political connections and was familiar with the de-
sign. In the end, the entrepreneur was awarded the contract despite the fact
that "[t]wo of the other five contenders offered lower cost bids and pro-
jected smaller toll collections."'
136
The leader of the opposition party, Lim Kit Siang, sought an injunction
against the project, 137 claiming that the signing of a letter of intent with
United Engineers amounted to an offence under Section Two of the Essen-
tial Powers Ordinance.38 This Ordinance criminalizes bribery and corrup-
tion by government officials. 39 While the tender ultimately withstood this
legal challenge, the case drew attention to the privatization process, in-
creased the need to justify the road based on public purposes and created an
expectation that the road would benefit the entire population.
40
The Expressway construction was the largest BOT project ever em-
barked on in Asia. The concession to United Engineers was granted until
the year 2018. At that point, the right to collect tolls would expire and con-
trol over the road would transfer back to the government. The construction
of the road involved 205 contracts, including forty-seven civil works,
eleven toll plaza contracts, five equipment contracts, eleven street lighting
contracts, one communications network contract, fifty-five topographical
survey contracts and seventy-five ground investment contracts.
14
Most of the large contracts were made with leading road construction
firms in the Asian region. Many smaller contracts were awarded to Malay-
135 On the use of various forms of international capital see Y. Dezalay and B.G. Garth,
Dollarizing State and Professional Expertise: Transnational Processes and Questions of Le-
gitimation in State Transformation 1960-2000, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES (M.B.
Likosky ed., Butterworths, London forthcoming).
136 R.S. Milne, Privatization in the ASEAN States: Who Gets What, Why, and With What
Effect, 65(1) Pacific Affairs 7, 17 (1992).
137 Siang v. United Engineers 2 M.L.J. 12 (1988).
138 Essential Powers Ordinance No. 22 of 1970.
"' L.K. Siang, North-South Highway Scandal (Democratic Action Party, Kuala Lumpur
1987).
140 The road building controversy was part of an ongoing political crisis in the country.
See T.S. Abas, SIR JOHN FOSTER GALAWAY MEMORIAL LECTURE: THE ROLE OF THE
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (Promarketing Publications, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1989) and
K.B. Teik, Between Law and Politics: The Malaysian Judiciary Since Independence, in
LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA 205 (K. Jayasuriya ed., Routledge 1999).
141 Davis, supra note 114, at 200-03.
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sian companies. 14 Capital financing for the large contracts was not difficult
to raise given the reputation of the subcontractors. Raising money to fi-
nance the carrying out of the smaller contracts was often more difficult, and
successful tapping of international capital markets depended upon oligar-
chic government guarantees. These guarantees took the form of agreements
to supplement, if necessary, the cash flow from low toll areas and insurance
against currency fluctuations for foreign capital markets.' 43 Ultimately, the
funding for the project was raised almost entirely in the domestic capital
markets. When the project was first tendered, it did not appear that the
capital markets would be able to finance such a large project. However, by
the time the litigation was settled and the project initiated, the capital mar-
kets were sufficiently developed.
144
E. Telecommunications and Satellites
The clearest physical manifestation of the Internet is the telecommuni-
cations lines that link computers. These connections may take on a number
of forms, including fibre-optic cables, telephone lines, satellite transmis-
sions, etc. A central feature of telecommunications policy is access. Given
the expense of telecommunications infrastructure and the variable quality of
services, governments often prioritize service provision and offer different
levels of service to different persons. Realising that telecommunications
were central to Malaysia's development plan, in the 1980s the government
turned its attention to developing a telecommunications strategy. The Sev-
enth Malaysia Plan indicates:
Priority will be accorded to development of a world-class telecommunications
infrastructure comprising fibre optics, satellite and wireless technology, and
services. The development of the information superhighway through the tele-
communications infrastructure will be accelerating during the Plan period.
With a total planned investment of about RM 25.4 billion, in addition to RM
20.3 billion already spent on satellites, fibre optics and broadband technology
by private operators, is envisaged that the telecommunications infrastructure
will enable the mass application of IT nationwide. A Telecommunications
Master Plan will be formulated to provide guidelines, among others, on inter-
connection and standards of services in order to promote greater efficiency and
accessibility. Telecommunications operators will be encouraged to upgrade
and improve services to further support the development of interactive multi-
media and IT. In addition, the launching of Malaysia's own satellites,
MEASAT I and II, will provide immediate and simultaneous, point-to-point
and point-to-multipoint telecommuncations and broadcasting services
throughout the country. 115
42 Id. at 203.
141 Id. at 203-04.
144 Id. at 199-207.
145 Seventh Malaysia Plan 465.
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The laying of telecommunications cables and the launching of satellites
require a tremendous amount of capital and technical expertise. To facili-
tate an influx in technological know-how and the requisite financial capital,
the government privatised the telecommunications industry in the 1980s.
The privatization process was carried out in two steps. Prior to privatiza-
tion, a government department, the Ministry of Energy, Telecommunica-
tions and Post, provided telecommunications services. This Ministry was
established in 1978 and telecommunications were managed within it by Ja-
batan Telekom Malaysia. In 1984, as the first step in the privatization of
telecommunications, the government established a public compound corpo-
ration, Telekom Malaysia, which took on the functions of Jabatan Telekom
Malaysia. In turn, Jabatan Telekom Malaysia was charged with regulating
the telecommunications industry. The second stage of telecommunications
privatization occurred in 1990 as Telekom Malaysia was partially privat-
ized. 46 After privatization, the Ministry of Finance retained a 76% share-
holding with domestic shares comprising sixteen percent and foreigners
holding eight percent.
47
Although Malaysia has not legislated a public monopoly of telecom-
munications, until 1993 Telekom Malaysia enjoyed a de facto monopoly.
In the absence of formal rules governing the telecommunications sector, the
Prime Minister's Office is accorded discretionary power over licensing. Of-
ten the Prime Minister will issue a license privately, the news of which will
not be made public for several months. Most commentators view this dis-
cretionary power retained by the executive as an impediment for Telekom
Malaysia. For instance, John Ure suggests that this discretion leaves the
company open to the Prime Minister's policy whims. 48 Heather Hudson
argues that Telekom Malaysia suffers from government influences damag-
ing its incentive structure. 49 While executive control over Telekom Malay-
sia does indeed make it subject to abuses of the executive prerogative, this
control also results in positive discrimination on the company's behalf.
Positive legislative discretion on behalf of Telekom Malaysia results in
a considerable competitive advantage for the company. Since telecommu-
nications are of strategic importance, the government has a strong interest in
ensuring the profitability of the company. Also, the privatization of many
public functions in the 1980s caused political unrest in the country. Oppo-
sition party members and, at times, the media expressed public disapproval
of the ruling party for its awarding of contracts to party patrons. These al-
legations were squelched through a variety of means, including opposition
146 G. Cheah, Malaysia, THE ASIA L GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 78.
147 John Ure Telecommunications in ASEAN and Indochina TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
ASIA: POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (ed. John Ure) 49, 57 (1997).
148 See supra note 150.
149 H.E. HUDSON, GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY 211 (Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York 1997).
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party jailing under the Internal Security Act and also the removal of
judges.150 However, the Prime Minister's Office had come under such in-
tense scrutiny that the success of privatization was a necessity to retain its
supremacy over the legislature and the courts. All eyes were on the privati-
zation process.
In the case of Telekom Malaysia the privatization was a commercial
success. The company is one of the most profitable Malaysian companies,
second only to the state-owned oil company, PETRONAS. 5' Telekom Ma-
laysia plays a central role in the government's high technology development
plans and has been contracted to complete the MSC telecommunications in-
frastructure. Also, it holds a position on the Board of Directors of the Mul-
timedia Development Corporation, the agency established by the
government to oversee the development of the MSC. Is2 Telekom Malay-
sia's position on the Corporation's Board affords it privileges in the policy-
making of the MSC.
Telekom Malaysia also has an ownership interest in many of the
MSC's development projects including Cyberview Holdings, the company
charged with the land development and urban construction of the MSC dis-
cussed earlier in this paper.' In addition, the company operates the Mul-
timedia University, which trains knowledge workers for the MSC. 154 These
equity holdings ensure that the company will profit from the success of the
MSC and also that it will receive lucrative infrastructure contracts.
As the primary telecommunications provider for the MSC, Telekom
Malaysia receives contracts for a range of government-instigated projects.
The MSC itself will be wired with fibre-optic cables connecting govern-
ment and businesses. Since the government intends these services to be
state-of-the-art, research and development by Telekom Malaysia is heavily
subsidized.
Government support for Telekom Malaysia also contributes to the
Company's international position. In addition to the government subsidis-
ing of research and development, the company also receives government
contracts to link the MSC to other high technology centres. In addition, the
government is intent on improving the Company's international economic
IS0 TS Abas Sir John Foster Galaway Memorial Lecture: The Role of the Independent
Judiciary (1989).
151 On PETRONAS, see V.K. Moorthy, The Malaysian National Oil Corporation-Is it a
Government Instrumentality?, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 638 (1981) and Jaginder Singh, The
Legal Structure and Attendant Problems of the National Petroleum Corporation of Malay-
sia, 18 MALAYSA L. REV. 125 (1976).
152 Multimedia Development Corporation Articles of Incorporation (on file with author).
153 See supra Part II.A.
"' On knowledge workers and the MSC see N.A. MAZELAN, M. HARNEVIE AND A.C.
VALIDA, MULTIMEDIA SUPER CORRIDOR: A JOURNEY TO EXCELLENCE IN INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER LEARNING 19-23 (ASEAN Academic P London 1999).
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standing. Therefore, the government works on behalf of the company to ar-
range contracts for telecommunications provision in neighboring countries.
While foreign ownership of Telekom Malaysia is capped at 33% per-
cent, it carries out its business in collaboration with foreign capital inter-
ests. 155 For instance, it often raises money through project financing. For
example, recently, it financed an equipment transaction under Islamic law
with financing coming from the Middle East. Legal services for this deal
were provided by the British law firm of Norton Rose.156
Telekom Malaysia thus benefits tremendously from its favored posi-
tion with the Prime Minister's Office. At the same time, Ure and Hudson
are correct in their assessment of the liabilities tied to this position. A com-
pany that lives by executive discrimination also may die, or at least be dam-
aged, by it. For instance, while up until 1993 Telekom Malaysia enjoyed a
de facto monopoly over fixed-wireline services, its position is dependent
upon continuing to receive government contracts and licenses. Its monop-
oly position has eroded as many of the recent licenses in mobile phone ser-
vices and related information infrastructure have been granted to close
relations of the party. 5 7 So, the government may shift the country away
from the technologies in which Telekom Malaysia has specialized. As the
Company specialises in fixed wire-line services, the government's recent
encouraging of cellular telephones and satellite services presents a threat to
its position.
Telecommunications services will also be offered in Malaysia through
satellite transmission, including international gateways and digital services.
Malaysia has three of its own satellites, MEASAT-1, MEASAT-2 and
MEASAT-3, in orbit and will use these satellites to provide services. These
satellites are the private property of Binariang Sdn Bhd, which is owned by
MAI Holdings.'5 8 Both are the property of Malaysian oil tycoon T. Ananda
Krishnan. Like many of the Malaysian high tech entrepreneurs, Krishnan
was educated at foreign institutions. Krishnan is a graduate of the Univer-
sity of Melbourne and the Harvard Business School. Also, Krishnan and
his company have close ties with the government. Krishnan is a long-time
friend of the Prime Minister. He was the director of the government's Bank
Negara and of PETRONAS, the government-owned oil company. 60 In ad-
dition, the government holds a 15% equity stake in his satellite television
broadcasting company, which broadcasts over the MEASAT satellites.
'55 John Ure, supra note 151, at 56-59.
156 Legal Advisers on Telekom Malaysia's $60 Million Leasing Facility, LAWMONEY, Oc-
tober 14, 1999.
157 John Ure, supra note 151, at 56-57.
'58 See generally, Malaysia's Binariang Plans to Launch Third Satellite ASIA PULSE, June
9, 2000.
'59 See generally Entertainment, BROADCASTING BUSINESS WEEKS, March 24, 1997.
160 On Krishnan, see GOMEZ & JOMO, supra note 98, at 159-65.
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In the case of Binariang, the executive prerogative to grant licenses is
also a source of positive discrimination on the company's behalf. One of
the main services offered b' Binariang is satellite television and radio
through its subsidiary Astro.' Binariang was licensed to launch Measat-1
and Measat-2 to transmit satellite services. Measat 1 and Measat 2 were
built by Hughes Space and Communications of the US and launched by
Arianespace, the European launch consortium. Several foreign media
broadcasting companies transmit services over Astro.1
62
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the development of infrastructure during the
colonial period and the present era. Infrastructure building must precede
any economic development plan. In both proto-Malaysia and present-day
Malaysia most of this infrastructure has been concentrated within the trans-
national commercial domain. This infrastructure was produced by com-
pound corporations in conjunction with oligarchic states.
When the foreign high tech TNCs enter the picture, they find many of
their infrastructure needs already met. Thus the creation of the MSC is
traceable to the privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s. The promotional lit-
erature, which is distributed to high technology companies celebrates the
merits of the existing infrastructure. With the infrastructure taken for
granted, companies are able to get onto further business.
161 See generally, Edgewise THE EDGE (Malaysia), October 1, 2000.
162 Sharifah AI-Attas, Blast Off. NEW STRAITs TIMEs, December 27, 1999.
